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Abstract 
While enhancing shareholder value is still a major goal for all company, the concepts of corporate governance (CG) and 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) enter the picture to reach to the goal. CG has been acclaimed as an instigator of tight 
internal control mechanisms. Under CG mechanism, firms are not encouraged only to promote ethics, fairness, transparency, and 
accountability in all their dealings, but to continue generating profits while maintaining the highest standards of governance 
internally as well. Cyert and March (1963) mention that a firm’s decisions should also be aligned with the interests of different 
players within and outside the company. Therefore, businesses have to also keep their activities prospered to external societies 
and communities. This is a starting point of CSR, which is mechanisms of how companies approach their interactions with their 
external environments from providing quality products and services, to undertaking charitable activities. By this way, it could not 
be denied that those performed firms have to alliance CG and CSR together within their businesses. Moreover, Bhimani and 
Soonawalla (2005) suggest that CG and CSR are two sides of the same coin. However, there are limited studies mentioned on CG 
and CSR in the same papers. In the light of this, using the US data during the period 2001 – 2004, this study does intend to 
explore the relationship of CG on CSR. 
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Hypothesis 
Agency Theory 
   Jensen and Meckling (1976) propose a theory of the firm (Agency Theory) based upon conflicts of interest 
between shareholders, company managers, and debt holders. They, in addition, specify the existence of “agency 
costs” which arise owing to the conflicts either between managers and shareholders (agency costs of equity) or 
between shareholders and debtholders (agency costs of debt). Financial markets capture these agency costs as a 
value loss to shareholder or agency problem. Moreover, the agency theory argues that an agency relationship exists 
when shareholders (principals) hire managers (agents) as the decision makers of the corporations. The agency 
© 2014 Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
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problems arise because managers will not solely act to maximize the shareholders’ wealth; they may protect their 
own interests or seek the goal of maximizing companies’ growth instead of earnings while making decisions. 
To reduce the agency problems, the need for the existence of CG is come to firms’ circumstances because 
of the agency problems incurred by the separation of the shareholders and managers. When it fails to enforce the 
contract between capital providers and managers, there has to be other mechanisms to ensure the efficiency of 
capital allocation in the economy. 
CG involves not only the internal mechanism but the external mechanism as well. Up to here CSR as the 
commitment of firms to societies comes to be a part of external mechanism of CG. This is an argument on the 
presence of positive linkage of CG and CSR lead to the following hypothesis: 
H1 :  CG and CSR are positively connected. 
 
III. Data, Measurement and Methodology 
Data  
CG Data: 
The CG data is from the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). According to Jiraporn et al. (2010), the 
governance standards report by ISS capture various dimensions of corporate governance containing eight categories 
include audit issues, board structure and composition, other charter and bylaw provisions, director education, 
executive and director compensation, director and officer ownership, progressive practices, and laws of the state of 
incorporation related to takeover defenses. 
CSR Data: 
 The CSR data is from the KLD database, which is published by the KLD Research & Analytics, Inc., a 
company that produces social investment research, rates companies on strengths and concerns in the following list 
of characteristics: 
• Corporate Governance (e.g., limited compensation to executives and members of the board, lack of tax 
disputes) 
• Community (e.g., generous giving, support for housing)  
• Diversity (e.g., promotion of women and minorities, outstanding family benefits) 
• Employee Relations (e.g., strong union relations, cash profit sharing) 
• Environment (e.g. pollution prevention, recycling) 
• Human Rights (e.g., labor rights in outsourcing, no operations in Burma) 
• Products (e.g., product quality and safety, provision of products for the economically disadvantaged) 
According to Harrison and Freeman (1999), the KLD Social Ratings data is the most frequently cited 
source of CSR in academic researches. 
Measurements 
Dependent Variable: CSR; KLD 
Independent Variable: CG; Logarithm ISS-Score 
Control Variables: This paper includes several corporate financial performance (CFP) variables to control 
for additional factors that may influence the propensity of firms’ to engage in CSR activity. Those variables are (1) 
leverage measuring by total debt over total assets : MKTDEBT, (2) firm size measuring by logarithm of total assets : 
LNTA, (3) financial performances; ROA measuring by earnings before interest and tax over total assets : EBITR, 
Tobin’s q measuring by market value of assets over book value of assets : Q, fixed assets over total assets : FIXAR, 
non-debt tax shields : NDTSR, credit ratings : CRATING, and dividends/total assets : DIVR (4) industry dummies 
for 3-digit SIC codes to controlling potential influences of industries.  
Methodology 
In order to test Effect of CG on CSR, this paper tests the effect of governance variables on CSR using the 
following general model: 
CSR = f (governance variables, control variables) 
In the above model, CSR are regressed against the two governance variables logarithm of ISS-Score and logarithm 
of Governance-Score and control variables capturing the firm’s performance, financial characteristics, and leverage, 
to examine the explanatory power of these variables.  
IV. Empirical Results 
 Different from the others, the evidence showed negative correlation between CG and CSR. 
Table 1 The Impact of CG and CFP on CSR 
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Table 3 illustrates the results of the regression analysis for each of four four-year subperiods and the full 
period. The test of the impact of CG on CSR was statistically significantly for only the full sample period and the 
subperiod 2002 allowed  us to conclude that the CG independent variable negatively affects firms’ CSR 
engagement. By this result, it ruins the belief that CG firms would overinvest on CSR to reduce the agency problem. 
Goel and Thakor’s (2008) described the CG negatively affects firms’ CSR engagement as the situation that 
overconfident managers sometimes make value destroying investments. Moreover, they explained that if 
overconfident CEOs tended to overinvest to build their reputations as good social citizens, an inverse association 
between CG and CSR choice would occur because the higher internal and external monitoring through various CG 
mechanisms should reduce the insiders’ incentive and opportunities for CSR overinvestment. Furthermore, for the 
impact results of CFP on CSR over the full period, this paper could not conclude the impact of the firms’ fixed 
assets to total assets ratio (FIXAR) and credit rating (CRATING) on CSR because the empirical study showed 
insignificant results. Moreover, the total debt to assets ratio is significant statistical negative results. As known, CSR 
engagements are costly activities and time consuming of reputation building so debt firms ignoring CSR activities.  
In addition, this study found statistically significant positive link between CSR and CFP, which is firm size 
(LNTA), firm value (Q), ROA (EBITR), and dividends to total assets (DIVR). This could be interpreted that the 
high performance firms engaged in CSR activities. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 Using the US data over the period 2001-2002, this paper presents the evidence of statistically significant 
negative impact of CG on CSR. Although, it could not conclude the link between firms’ fixed assets to total assets 
ratio and credit rating on CSR, the finding, for high performance firms, showed statistically significant positive link 
between CSR and CFP, which are firm size, firm value, ROA, and dividends to total assets. 
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CG MKTDEBT LNTA EBITR Q FIXAR NDTSR CRATING DIVR 
F-statistic 
(P-Value) 
Obs. 
2001-04 
t-statistics 
-0.022 
-0.02 
-0.638*** 
-4.13 
-1.454*** 
-4.40 
0.309*** 
8.64 
1.022*** 
4.08 
0.119*** 
4.36 
-0.217 
-0.94 
3.749*** 
3.31 
0.037 
1.37 
3.442*** 
2.92 
5.12*** 
(0.00) 
3483 
2001 
t-statistics 
1.852 
0.44 
-0.799 
-1.03 
-1.808 
-1.15 
0.329** 
1.99 
0.945 
0.72 
0.013 
0.10 
-0.371 
-0.36 
1.930 
0.46 
-0.120 
-0.11 
20.989* 
1.71 
1.02 
(0.44) 
357 
2002 
t-statistics 
3.737 
0.97 
-1.179* 
-1.70 
0.121 
0.10 
0.291** 
2.09 
1.692 
1.13 
0.228 
1.51 
0.273 
0.31 
13.023** 
2.17 
-0.031 
-0.34 
23.151** 
2.29 
1.45*** 
(0.00) 
503 
2003 
t-statistics 
-2.189 
-1.44 
0.002 
0.01 
-1.371*** 
-2.64 
0.207*** 
3.59 
1.485*** 
3.07 
0.120*** 
2.69 
-0.113 
-0.31 
3.367 
1.56 
0.017 
0.39 
2.076 
1.27 
1.89*** 
(0.00) 
1257 
2004 
t-statistics 
-0.983 
-0.52 
-0.317 
-1.00 
-1.916*** 
-3.36 
0.314*** 
5.03 
0.823** 
2.27 
0.119*** 
2.81 
-0.675* 
-1.65 
1.517 
0.70 
0.028 
0.61 
3.844** 
2.15 
1.87*** 
(0.00) 
1366 
